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RECENT DECISIONS
CORPORATIONS-PARENT CORPORATION NOT RESPoNSIBrLE FOR NoNPnorzT-SuBsID-
IARY'S DEBT OBLIGATIoNs.-Defendant cooperative corporation, organized for the
purpose of providing low cost housing for its shareholders, formed a subsidiary to
build and sell houses to the shareholders of the parent at cost. Subsequent financial
difficulties resulted in creditors assuming the construction responsibilities pursuant to
an extension agreement with the parent and the subsidiary. The subsidiary later was
adjudicated bankrupt and the plaintiff, as its trustee, attempted to hold the parent
liable for the debts of the subsidiary. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint
and the Appellate Division affirmed. Upon appeal, held, one judge dissenting, affirmed.
The parent will not be responsible for the obligations of its subsidiary when there has
been no fraud or illegality in the formation or operation of the latter. Bartle v.
Home Owners Cooperative, Inc., 309 N.Y. 103, 127 N.E. 2d 832 (1955).
Although the corporate form of business organization carries with it the attribute
of being a non-conductor of liability to its stockholders,' this concept of total stock-
holder immunity is not without exception.2 Where a corporation is organized for the
purpose of evading existing obligations, frustrating existing laws, or perpetrating a
fraud, it is generally agreed that the corporate veil will be thrown aside.3
Specific application of these general principles has engendered considerable contro-
versy giving rise to varied theories of imposing liability on the stockholders. 4 In
1. Lowendahl v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 247 App. Div. 144, 287 N.Y. Supp. 62 (Ist
Dep't 1936), aff'd, 272 N.Y. 360, 6 N.E. 2d 56 (1936), motion for reargument denied, 273
N.Y. 584, 7 N.E. 2d 704 (1937) ; Brooklyn Savings Bank v. Wechsler Estate, 259 N.Y. 9, 14,
180 N.E. 752, 753 (1932) ; Berkey v. Third Avenue Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58 (1926) ;
Doran v. New York City Interborough Ry., 239 N.Y. 448, 147 N.E. 62 (1925); Vannier v.
Anti-Saloon League, 238 N.Y. 457, 463, 144 N.E. 679, 681 (1924) ; Brock v. Poor, 216 N.Y.
287, 302, 111 N.E. 229, 236 (1915); Sasmor v. V. Vivaudou Inc., 200 Metc 1020, 103 N.Y.
S. 2d 640 (Sup. Ct. 1951). See 1 Fletcher, Private Corporations § 1 (penn. ed. 1931).
2. Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); Davis v. Alexander,
269 U.S. 114, 117 (1925); United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920); Chicago, Mil-
waukee, & St. Paul Ry. v. Minneapolis Civic and Commerce Ass'n, 247 U.S. 490 (1918);
Luckenback S.S. Co. v. Grace & Co., 267 Fed. 676, 681 (4th Cir. 1920), cert. denied, 254
U.S. 644 (1920) ; Joseph Foard Co. v. Maryland, 219 Fed. 827, 829 (4th Cir. 1914) ; Herman
v. Mobile Homes Corp., 317 Aich. 233, 26 N.W. 2d 757 (1947) ; Floral Park Lawns Inc. v.
O'Connell, 250 App. Div. 464, 294 N.Y. Supp. 991 (2d Dep't 1937); Page], Horton & Co.
v. Harmon Paper Co., 236 App. Div. 47, 258 N.Y. Supp. 168 (4th Dep't 1932); Reconstruc-
tion Syndicate Inc. v. Sharpe, 186 Mfisc. 897, 61 N.Y.S. 2d 176 (N.Y. Munic. Ct 1946);
In re Steinberg's Estate, 153 Misc. 339, 274 N.Y. Supp. 914 (Surr. Ct. 1934) ; Bressman, Inc.
v. Mosson, 127 Misc. 282, 215 N.Y. Supp. 766 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1926). See Elenkrieg v.
Siebrecht, 238 N.Y. 254, 262, 144 N.E. 519, 521 (1924).
3. C. S. Goss & Co. v. Goss, 147 App. Div. 698, 132 N.Y. Supp. 76 (Ist Dep't 1911),
aff'd, 207 N.Y. 742, 101 N.E. 1099 (1913); Tompkins v. Miller, Tompkins & Co., 207 App.
Div. 819, 201 N.Y. Supp. 392 (2d Dep't 1923). See People v. North River Sugar Refining
Co., 121 N.Y. 582, 24 N.E. 834 (1890), appeal dismissed, 121 N.Y. 696, 24 N.E. 1099 (1890).
See also 1 Fletcher, Private Corporations § 25, 41 (perm. ed. 1931); Powell, Parent &
Subsidiary Corporations (1931); Wormser, The Disregard of the Corporate Fiction (1927).
4. See Lowendahl v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 247 App. Div. 144, 287 N.Y. Supp. 62 (Ist
Dep't 1936), aff'd, 272 N.Y. 360, 6 N.E. 2d 56 (1936), motion for reargument denied, 273
N.Y. 584, 7 N.E. 2d 704 (1937). See also Dix, The Armor of the juridical Conception, 34
Geo. L.J. 432 (1946); Douglas & Shanks, Insulation from Liability through Subsidiary
Corporations, 39 Yale L.J. 193 (1929).
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small one-man corporations, the alter ego or identity theory is used to preserve the
rights of creditors or otherwise prevent the commission of injustices which might arise
as a result of the intermingling of funds or misrepresentations to creditors by the sole
stockholder. Accordingly, at times, the stockholder is estopped from setting up the
corporate fiction as a defense to his liability.5 In the case of larger corporations,
where the entity of a subsidiary has in fact been divested of all its autonomy, the
so-called instrumentality theory is employed to pierce the corporate veil.0 In still
other cases, the corporate entity is recognized but liability is imposed on the parent
under the principles of agency because of the contractual relationship found between
the stockholder and the corporation.7 Despite these substantive differences between
the instrumentality and the agency concept of transferring liability, the courts have
sometimes confused this distinction by using the terms agency and instrumentality
interchangeably.8
New York has been regarded as a strict adherent of the corporate fiction theory9
possibly due to the dicta in Berkey v. Third Avenue Ry. Corp.1° although subsequent
decisions have departed from such dicta."1 For example even where the subsidiary
S. Quaid v. Ratkowsky, 183 App. Div. 428, 170 N.Y. Supp. 812 (1st Dep't 1918), aff'd
without opinion, 224 N.Y. 624, 121 N.E. 887 (1918); C. S. Goss & Co. v. Goss, 147 App.
Div. 698, 132 N.Y. Supp. 76 (1st Dep't 1911), aff'd, 207 N.Y. 742, 101 N.E. 1099 (1913);
Reconstruction Syndicate, Inc. v. Sharpe, 186 Misc. 897, 61 N.Y.S. 2d 176 (N.Y. Munic. Ct.
1946); Bressman, Inc. v. Mosson, 127 Misc. 282, 215 N.Y. Supp. 766 (App. T. 1st Dep't
1926). See Fuller, The Incorporated Individual: A Study of the One-Man Company, 51
Harv. L. Rev. 1373 (1938).
6. McCaskill Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 504 (1910); United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Co., 234 Fed. 127 (E.D. Mo. 1916), appeal dismissed, 254 U.S. 666 (1921);
Luckenback S.S. Co. v. Grace & Co., 267 Fed. 676, 681 (4th Cir. 1920), cert. denied, 254
U.S. 644 (1920); Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Newton, 289 Fed. 1013, 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1923);
Mangan v. Terminal Transp. System, 157 Misc. 627, 284 N.Y. Supp. 183 (Sup. Ct. 1935), aff'd,
247 App. Div. 853, 286 N.Y. Supp. 666 (3rd Dep't 1936), appeal denied, 272 N.Y. 676 (1936);
People ex rel. Studebaker Corp. v. Gilchrist, 244 N.Y. 114, 123, 155 N.E. 68, 71 (1926). See
Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent & Subsidiary Corporations, 14 Calif. L. Rev. 12 (1925).
7. Lehigh Valley R.R. v. Delachesa, 145 Fed. 617 (2d Cir. 1906); Rapid Transit Subway
Constr. Co. v. City of N.Y., 259 N.Y. 472, 488, 182 N.E. 145, 150 (1932); Floral Park
Lawns, Inc. v. O'Connell, 250 App. Div. 464, 294 N.Y. Supp. 991 (2d Dep't 1937). See
Berkey v. Third Avenue Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 95, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926).
8. United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920); Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul
Ry. v. Minneapolis Civic and Commerce Ass'n, 247 U.S. 490 (1918); Kingston Dry Dock
Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F. 2d 265, 267 (2d Cir. 1929); Lowendahl v. Balti-
more & Ohio R.R., 247 App. Div. 144, 287 N.Y. Supp. 62 (1st Dep't 1936), aff'd, 272 N.Y.
360, 6 N.E. 2d 56 (1936), motion for reargument denied, 273 N.Y. 584, 7 N.E. 2d 704 (1937) ;
Pagel, Horton & Co. v. Harmon Paper Co., 236 App. Div. 47, 258 N.Y. Supp. 168 (4th
Dep't 1932). See Rohrlich, Organizing Corporate & Other Business Enterprises § 12.03
(1949); Powell, Parent & Subsidiary Corporations § 21 (1931); Douglas & Shanks, Insula-
tion from Liability through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 Yale L.J. 193 (1929).
9. Weisser v. Mursam Shoe Corp., 127 F. 2d 344, 348 (2d Cir. 1942). See Powell, Parent
& Subsidiary Corporations § 13(e) (1931); Wormser, The Disregard of the Corporate
Fiction (1927).
10. 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58 (1926).
11. The court in the Berkey case based its decision upon the ground that to hold the
defendant liable, it must imply an illegal contract and find that the defendant was Illegally
operating the cars and lines involved. Mangan v. Terminal Transp. System, 157 Misc. 627,
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has substantially no business except.with the parent or no assets except for those con-
veyed to it by the parent,' 2 or where there is control of the subsidiary through sub-
stantial stock ownership 13 or where the two corporations have similar identity in their
directorial boards or executive oices," New York has meticulously followed the
corporate fiction theory.
In the instant case, the majority refused to impose liability on the parent because
there had been no fraud or misrepresentation to the creditors of the subsidiary in its
inception or operation. The trial court found that the creditors were estopped by the
credit extension agreement to deny the two separate corporate entities.s Agreement
by the majority in the present case with such finding gave it alternative grounds for
holding the parent not liable.
The minority opinion stressed the subsidiary's undercapitalization and inability to
make a profit as reasons for imposing liability in spite of the fact that the trial court
found as a matter of fact that there was no undercapitalization.' 0 In other jurisdic-
tions such undercapitalization of a subsidiary to cope with the normal business condi-
tions has been deemed a prime factor in piercing its corporate veiL' 7 A subsidiary so
organized that it must depend upon the parent's discretion for a source of working
capital will be held to be a mere department or instrumentality of the parent.' 8
Undercapitalization thus considered as a factor in piercing the corporate entity has
never been explicitly considered by the New York courts. It would seem under New
York's usual adherence to the entity theory undercapitalization by itself will not be
decisive in piercing the corporate entity. This may or may not be a fair inference
depending upon whether the majority relied on the trial court's findings or considered
undercapitalization an irrelevant factor.')
Inability of a subsidiary to make a profit has been considered by the courts of
633, 284 N.Y. Supp. 183, 190 (Sup. Ct. 1935), aff'd, 247 App. Div. 853, 286 N.Y. Supp. 666
(3rd Dep't 1936), appeal denied, 272 N.Y. 676 (1936); P.S. & A. Realties, Inc. v. Lodge
Gate Forest, Inc., 205 Misc. 245, 127 N.Y.S. 2d 315 (Sup. CL 1954).
12. Sasmor v. V. Vivaudou, Inc., 200 Misc. 1020, 103 N.Y.S. 2d 640 (Sup. Ct. 1951);
Hayman v. Morris, 46 N.Y.S. 2d 482 (Sup. CL 1943).
13. Lowendahl v. Baltimore & Ohio R.Y Co., 247 App. Div. 144, 287 N.Y. Supp. 62
(1st Dep't 1936), aft'd, 272 N.Y. 360, 6 N.E. 2d 56 (1936), motion for reargument denied,
273 N.Y. 584, 7 N.. 2d 704 (1937); Oceanic Insul-Lite Corp. v. Sullivan Dry Dock &
Repair Corp., 191 Misc. 354, 77 N.Y.S. 2d 498 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
14. Transamerican General Corp. v. Zunino, 32 N.Y.S. 2d 595 (Sup. Ct. 1943);
Oceanic Insul-Lite Corp. v. Sullivan Dry Dock & Repair Corp., 191 Misc. 354, 77 N.Y.S. 2d
498 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
15. Record on Appeal, p. 47, Bartle v. Home Owners Cooperative, Inc., 309 N.Y. 103,
127 N.E. 2d 832 (1955).
16. Id. at 46.
17. Luckenback SS. Co. v. Grace & Co., 267 Fed. 676, 681 (4th Cir. 1920), cert. denied,
254 US. 644 (1920) ; Mosher v. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 39 Ariz. 567, 8 P. 2d
1077 (1932) ; Albert Richards Co. v. The Mayfair, 287 Mass. 280, 191 N.E. 430 (1934) ;
Herman v. Mobile Homes Corp., 137 Mich. 233, 26 N.W. 2d 757 (1947); Oriental Invest-
ment Co. v. Barclay, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 543, 64 S.W. 80 (1901); Atwater & Co. v. Fall
River Pocahontas Collieries, 119 W. Va. 549, 195 S.E. 99 (1938). See Anderson v. Abbott,
321 US. 349, 362 (1944), rehearing denied, 321 U .S. 804 (1944). See also Latty, Subsidiaries
and Affiliated Corporations, at 135 (1936).
18. Luckenback S.S. Co. v. Grace & Co., 267 Fed. 676, 681 (4th Cir. 1920), cert.
denied, 254 U.S. 644 (1920).
19. See note 16 supra.
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other jurisdictions to be a prime factor in their decisions rendering the parent liable
for the subsidiary's obligations.2° In the instant case, however, the majority of the
court held that the inability of the subsidiary to make a profit in the absence of
fraud 2' was not of sufficient magnitude to warrant disregarding the subsidiary's
entity.2
2
The majority in the principal case by decreeing the two corporations were separate
and distinct entities has reaffirmed the severe New York policy of not disregarding
the corporate veil except in well defined circumstances.
CRIMINAL LAW-MISDEMEANOR MANSLAUGHTER-NEcESSITY FOR NOTICE OF STAT-
UTORY VIOLTIONS.-Defendant was convicted on an indictment embracing two counts.
The first charged manslaughter, first degree, in that the death of two persons was
caused by a fire in defendant's multiple dwelling, for which defendant had knowingly
neglected to provide adequate fire protection, such failure constituting a misdemeanor
under the Multiple Dwelling Law. The second, charging manslaughter, second degree,
was in substance an accusation of culpable negligence under the same facts and cir-
cumstances embodied in the first count. On trial, after admitting extensive evidence
offered by the prosecution on the question of notice, the court refused to allow the
defendant's evidence on the same issue, ruling that lack of notice or knowledge of the
building violations afforded no defense. The Appellate Division eliminated the sen-
tence imposed on the second degree manslaughter conviction and, as modified, affirmed
the conviction. On appeal, held, two judges dissenting, affirmed. People v. Nelson,
309 N.Y. 231, 128 N.E. 2d 391 (1955).
At common law involuntary manslaughter was defined as the unintentional killing
of a human being while engaged in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting
to a felony or as the result of culpable negligence, the former being commonly known
today as misdemeanor manslaughter, and the latter, negligent homicide.1 Several
theories have been proposed to explain the rationale on which misdemeanor man-
slaughter, and its companion crime, felony murder, are based. One theory advanced
is the unwillingness of common law judges to base convictions on implied malice
where death was obviously unintentional, when a more simple and direct approach
was available, viz., that the defendant was guilty because he was engaged in an un-
lawful act at the time the death occurred.2 Another view attributes the development
of the doctrine to a desire for vengeance on the defendant whether or not he had an
intent to effect death, as the loss to society was the same in either event.3 A third
20. Erickson v. Minnesota & Ontario Power, 134 Minn. 209, 215, 158 N.W. 979, 981
(1916); Atwater & Co. v. Fall River Pocahontas Collieries, 119 W. Va. 549, 195 S.E. 99
(1938). See Oriental Investment Co. v. Barclay, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 543, 64 S.W. 80 (1901);
Latty, Subsidiaries and Affiliated Corporations, pp. 138, 139 (1936).
21. This has been treated in New York but only where there has been a fraudulent
transfer. Natelson v. A.B.L. Holding Co., 260 N.Y. 233, 238, 183 N.E. 373, 374 (1932);
African Metals Corp. v. Bullowa, 288 N.Y. 78, 85, 41 N.E. 2d 466, 470 (1942), motion
denied, 288 N.Y. 673,43 N.E. 2d 75 (1942).
22. See Record on Appeal, p. 264, Bartle v. Home Owners Cooperative, Inc., 309 N.Y.
103, 127 N.E. 2d 832 (1955).
1. Wharton, Homicide§ 212 (3d ed. 1907).
2. Wilner, Unintentional Homicide in the Commission of an Unlawful Act. 87 Pa. L.
Rev. 811 (1939).
3. 1 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 195 (7th ed. 1795).
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theory, applicable to felony murder only, suggests that since a person may defend
against felony even to the point of killing the malefactor, therefore, where one engages
in a felonious act for which he may lawfully be killed, it is natural to infer that he
intends to kill if necessary and that is a sufficient intent for murder.t The more logical
view, however, is that at common law nearly all felonies were punishable by death,
and where one engaged in a felony "... the felonious intent was imputed to the
committed act, and, if it were homicide, made it murder; for it was considered imma-
terial whether a man hanged for one felony or another."5 On the other hand, where
no felonious intent accompanied the death-producing act, as in the case of a misde-
meanor, it seemed natural for the courts to reduce the crime to manslaughter.0
After the promulgation of the misdemeanor-manslaughter doctrine it became very
evident that few situations would arise where a defendant was not engaging in at
least a minor unlawful act at the time an unintentional homicide occurred, and thus
few cases where the doctrine would be inapplicable.7 Hence it was almost inevitable
that relief from the rigors of the rule would come in some form.8 The credit for the
first limitation on the rule is given, by most text writers, to Hale, who propounded the
theory that only acts mala in se and not those merely mala prohibita could form the
basis of an involuntary manslaughter conviction.0 Although this is still undoubtedly
true as a general principle, those jurisdictions which still observe this distinction gen-
erally relieve from criminal liability in the case of an act malum prohibitum only
where it is dear that the act in question is not inherently dangerous and there is no
negligence in its performance.10 The strength of Hale's rule of distinction lay in its
presupposition of the existence of moral guilt which, with limited exceptions, is the
accepted criterion for determining criminal guilt.11 On the other hand, a pAlpable
weakness of the rule is its vagueness. Courts have found it well nigh impossible to
draw a line distinguishing between acts mala in se and acts mala prohibita and each
new attempt to do so has only served to confound an already thoroughly confused
subject. 12 It is submitted that conviction of such a major felony as manslaughter
should not depend on a distinction which few courts can comprehend much less apply.
4. Annotation to Regina v. Horsey, 3 Fost. & Fin. 287, 176 Eng. Rep. 129 (Nisi Prius
1862).
5. Powersv. Commonwealth, 110 Ky. 386, -, 61 S.W. 735, 741 (1901).
6. Cf. Powers v. Commonwealth, 110 Ky. 386, 61 S.W. 735, 741 (1901).
7. See Report of the N.Y. State Law Revision Commission, at 744 (1937).
8. Id. at 663, 664.
9. 1 Hale, Pleas of the Crown 474, 475. See also Note, 87 Pa. L. Rev. 811, 827 n. 10
(1939).
10. Potter v. State, 162 Ind. 213, 70 N.E. 129 (1904); Thiede v. State, 106 Neb. 48,
182 N.W. 570 (1921); State v. Horton, 139 N.C. 588, 51 S.E. 945 (1905).
11. People v. Werner, 174 N.Y. 132, 66 N.E. 667 (1903); People v. D'Antonio, 150 App.
Dliv. 109, 134 N.Y. Supp. 657 (Ist Dep't 1912).
12. In Commonwealth v. Adams, 114 Mlass. 323, 324 (1873) the court aid: "Acts mala
in se include, in addition to felonies, all breaches of public order, injuries to person or
property, outrages upon public decency or good morals, and breaches of official duty, when
done wilfully or corruptly. Acts mala prohibita include any matter forbidden or commanded
by statute, but not otherwise wrong." In State v. Horton, 139 N.C. 588, 51 S.E. 945 (1905)
it was held that an act malum in se is one which is naturally evil as adjudged by the sense of
a civilized community but that an act malum prohibitum is wrong only because made so by
statute. In People v. Pavlic, 227 Mich. 562, 199 N.W. 373 (1924) the court held that the
statutory offense of furnishing intoxicating liquors for consumption, although a felony,
nevertheless was merely malum prohibitum.
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An enlightened trend of authorities today disregards this distinction and accepts
a rule which has both rationality and facility of application. Under this view, there
is criminal responsibility for a homicide committed in the course of an unlawful act
if the act is inherently dangerous or the law violated was specifically designed for the
protection of human life.13 Other means of avoiding the application of the misde-
meanor manslaughter doctrine have been devised, such as arguments that the homicide
was not the natural and probable consequence of the unlawful act 1 4 or that defend-
ant's act was not the proximate cause of death.15 In New York a statutory limitation
has been placed upon the rule by requiring the misdemeanor on which the man-
slaughter is predicated to be one "affecting the person or property, either of the person
killed, or of another . ... 16 Lastly, the doctrine of merger of assault into homi-
cide has played an important role in limiting the application of the rules of construc-
tive homicide. 17
Although misdemeanor manslaughter does not require the finding of an actual
design to effect death, the courts unanimously insist that there be an intent to commit
the act which constitutes the misdemeanor and of which the homicide is a conse-
quence.' 8 As in felony murder, the intent to commit the independent crime is trans-
ferred, by implication of law, to the homicide, 19 in order to provide the criminal intent
requisite for all felonies.
In the instant case the trial court ruled that not only was defendant strictly account-
able insofar as the violations of the Multiple Dwelling Law were concerned; but
furthermore, neither ignorance of the condition of the building nor ignorance of the
statute afforded a defense to first degree manslaughter. In affirming the conviction,
the majority of the Court of Appeals approved the trial court's finding that at the
time the deaths occurred defendant was engaged in a continuing misdemenaor affect-
ing the person or property of the two persons killed. It is to be noted that inasmuch
as the majority placed particular emphasis on testimony given at trial tending to show
defendant's actual knowledge of the violations, it would appear that it deemed notice
13. State v. Palmer, 197 N.C. 135, 147 S.E. 817 (1929) ;,Commonwealth v. Samson,
130 Pa. Super. 65, 196 Atl. 564 (Super. Ct. 1938); State v. Brown, 205 S.C. 514, 32 S.E.
2d 825 (1945).
14. Votre v. State, 192 Ind. 684, 138 N.E. 257 (1923); Commonwealth v. Couch, 32
Ky. 638, 106 S.W. 830 (1908).
15. Jackson v. State, 101 Ohio St. 152, 127 N.E. 870 (1920); State v. Mulcahy, 318 Ill.
332, 149 N.E. 266 (1925).
16. N.Y. Penal Law § 1050(1). The misdemeanor referred to in this section must
be one separate and apart from the act of killing and not one which merges into the homicide.
People v. Vollmer, 299 N.Y. 347, 87 N.E. 2d 291 (1949); People v. Grieco, 266 N.Y. 48,
193 N.E. 634 (1934). Contra, People v. Darragh, 141 App. Div. 408, 126 N.Y. Supp. 219,
aff'd without opinion, 203 N.Y. 527 (1911).
17. This doctrine has been held applicable to both misdemeanor manslaughter and felony
murder. People v. Grieco, 266 N.Y. 48, 193 N.E. 634 (1934); People v. Luscomb, 292 N.Y.
390, 55 N.E. 2d 469 (1944).
18. People v. Grieco, 266 N.Y. 48, 193 N.E. 634 (1934); People v. Fitzsimmons, 11
N.Y. Crim. 391, 34 N.Y. Supp. 1102 (Ct. of Sess. 1895); Commonwealth v. Couch, 32 Ky.
638, 106 S.W. 830 (1908) ; State v. Goodley, 9 Houst. 484, 33 Atl. 226 (Ct. of Gen. Sess.
of the Peace and Jail Delivery of Del. 1889). Cf. Commonwealth v. Adams, 114 Mass, 232
(1873). See also Wharton, Homicide § 213 (3d ed. 1907): "But while homicide perpetrated
in the commission of some unlawful act is manslaughter, though the death of the person
killed was not intended, yet the unlawful act must be wilful, and not a mere misadventure."
19. People v. Hubbard, 64 Cal. App. 27, 220 Pac. 315 (Dist. Ct. of App. 1923).
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or knowledge, and thus intent, quite material to a conviction. It would thus seem to
follow, in view of the trial court's refusal to admit evidence offered by defendant on
the issue of notice, and its ruling that knowledge of the violations was not a necessary
element of the crime charged, that a reversal of the conviction and the granting of a
new trial would have been proper.
On the other hand, in view of the court's affirmance of the conviction without pass-
ing on the correctness of the trial court's ruling on the question of notice, the decision
might impliedly be based on the ground that notice or knowledge of the statutory
violations was not requisite to a conviction of manslaughter. It is unquestionable that
as to acts merely mala prohibita, as the violations no doubt were, knowledge, as a
basis for inferring a wrongful intent, is not a necessary factor;^ however, to hold that
notice or knowledge, and thus intent, is equally immaterial where those very acts arm
utilized as a basis for a conviction of homicide resulting therefrom is an altogether
different proposition. Under the doctrine of transferred intent, which supplies the
foundation on which the whole law of constructive felony rests, one who accidentally
causes the death of another during the intentional commission of an unlawful act will
be deemed in law to have intended such death.21 However, it does not follow that
where acts2 have been made misdemeanors by statute even in the absence of any
wrongful intention, the necessity for finding actual intent when those same acts are
used as a basis for a homicide conviction is obviated. The lack of an intent which
can be transferred precludes the finding of the mens rea necessary for a conviction. -
Furthermore, considerable reliance is placed by the majority on the case of People
v. Alexander,24 where the Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed a conviction of
manslaughter in the first degree under circumstances strikingly similar to those in the
principal case. In that case it unequivocally appeared that the defendant had knowl-
edge of the facts which constituted the misdemeanor. Thus the cases are readily dis-
tinguishable on the ground that the court in the Alexander case might properly have
found, on the basis of the defendant's knowledge, an actual intent to commit the
independent misdemeanor.
Much revulsion has been expressed for constructive felony and the courts have
tended to limit its application by requiring, among other things, affirmative proof of
intentional wrongdoing with respect to the lesser crime before utilizing it as a basis
for a conviction of a more grievous wrong.2 5 The instant case appears to go a long
way towards negativing that just and proper limitation on an unfortunate and harsh
rule of law.
FEDERAL JURISDICTIN-CoURTs-RIGHT TO JuRy TRAL iN BLuirrmnE TonT
DENIED IN THE ABsENCE OF DvwRsrr Op CrzNsHn.-Plaintiff, an alien stevedore,
was injured while working aboard a ship owned by defendant, a foreign corporation.
Suit was commenced in the federal district court on the civil side, plaintiff alleging
negligence and unseaworthiness. Defendant's motion to have the action set aside for
lack of jurisdiction, at first denied, was granted on motion to reargue. Upon appeal,
20. Wharton, Homicide § 213 (3d ed. 1907).
21. Ibid. See also Commonwealth v. Adams, 114 Mlass. 323 (1873).
22. Note that the act made a misdemeanor in the instant case is one of omission. That
an omissive act as well as a commissive act may properly form the basis of a manslaughter
conviction, see People v. Alexander, 293 N.Y. 870, 59 N.E. 2d 451 (1944).
23. Cf. Perlns, Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 905, 928 (1939).
24. 293 N.Y. 870, 59 N.E. 2d 451 (1944).
25. See note 18 supra.
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held, affirmed. In the absence of diversity of citizenship, a federal district court can-
not entertain an action on its civil side, where a maritime tort is involved. Paduano
v. Yamashita Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha, 221 F. 2d 615 (2d Cir. 1955).
The question of where to seek relief in causes involving maritime torts has vexed
the courts for some time.' In the present state of the law a suitor has two established
avenues of relief available: (1) he may bring suit on the admiralty side of a federal
district court, based on that court's exclusive jurisdiction in admiralty and maritime
matters; 2 (2) he may sue in a state court if he can satisfy jurisdictional requirements,
and show a cause of action based on a maritime matter cognizable at common law.8
The admiralty forum carries with it the questionable disadvantage of lack of trial by
jury.4 For various reasons, state forums are not always open.6 Because of these con-
siderations, and probably because of the federal juries' reputation for generosity, there
has been a tendency of late to bring such causes into the federal district courts, on
the civil side, in reliance on the "saving to suitors" clause of the admiralty grant.0
Today, by far the major portion of cases appearing on the civil side of the federal
dockets consists of those wherein the litigants are citizens of different states,7 or
where the subject matter "arises under" the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.8 Diversity of citizenship being absent in the present case, plaintiff
attempted to bring himself within the "arising under" jurisdiction. His contention was
that since -the federal judiciary has been granted exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty
and maritime matters, such matters must ipso facto "arise under" the Constitution
and laws of the United States and that he is therefore entitled to his common law
remedy within the purview of the "saving to suitors" clause. While it has long been
held that this clause applies in cases where there is diversity,9 a split of authority has
existed for some time as to its application in cases where diversity is lacking.10
1. See Note, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 315 (1952) for a discussion of this question as it existed
prior to the holding in the instant case.
2. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the
States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in
all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333 (1948).
3. 1 Benedict, Admiralty § 22 (6th ed. 1940).
4. Mullen v. Eastern Transp. Co., 25 F. Supp. 62, 63 (E.D. Pa. 1938) ; O'Brien v. United
States Tank Ship Corp., 16 F. Supp. 478, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1936); 2 Benedict, Admiralty § 224
(6th ed. 1940). In certain cases, e.g., where a contract or tort action arises on lakes or
navigable waters connecting such lakes, jury trial may be had, if either party demands It, 28
U.S.C.A. § 1873 (1948). Also, under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688 (1920), an Injured
seaman may have a trial by jury for personal injuries suffered in the course of his
employment.
5. New York has, for example, a policy of forum non conveniens as to tort actions
between nonresident parties where the cause of action does not arise within the state. DeLa-
Bouillerie v. DeVienne, 300 N.Y. 60, 89 N.E. 2d 15 (1949); Collard v. Beach, 81 App. Dtv.
582, 81 N.Y. Supp. 619 (1st Dep't 1903).
6. See note 2 supra.
7. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions ... between:
(1) Citizens of different States." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (1) (1948).
8. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the
matter in controversy . . . arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United
States." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (1948).
9. judge Dimock, concurring in the instant case seems to take issue with this however.
221 F. 2d at 620-21. Considered infra.
10. Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F. 2d 834 (1st Cir. 1952) ; Jordine v. Walling, 185 F. 2d
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While the Supreme Court has never directly ruled on the question here presented,
it has however dealt with the problem indirectly in appeal cases from lower federal
and state courts. L In relation to the state courts at least, it would seem that the
Court could assume such a position only if there was a federal question involved,'2
assuming, of course, that the constitutional rights of appellant had not been infringed
upon below. The language of the Court suggests without equivocation-that maritime
law, is at least, "national law." In Southern Pacific v. Jensen the Court said that
".. . the general maritime law as accepted by the federal courts constitutes part of
our national law. . . ."13 This ruling was recently reaffirmed by the decision in Pope
& Talbot Inc. v. Hawn'4 where the Supreme Court ruled that the application of state
law by a federal court and jury was error if such state law conflicted with established
federal principles of maritime law in a case where the right to recover was based on
the general maritime law. The Court said that since the cause of action arose on
navigable waters, it became: ". . . a maritime tort, a type of action which the Consti-
tution has placed under national power to control in its substantive as well as proce-
dural features .. "5
Seizing upon this attitude of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit, in the case of Doucette v. Vincent,16 has held that since the general maritime
law is national law, a cause of action based upon it properly comes within the "arising
under" grant, and that a suitor with such a claim is enitled to his common-law remedy
in a federal district court, by virtue of the "saving to suitors" clause, even in the
absence of diversity. Whether the Doucette court was justified in reading such an
inference into the Supreme Court holdings is highly questionable. The mere fact that
a maritime tort involves the "national law" does not necessarily bring such an action
within the meaning of section 1331 of the Judicial Code. It has long been established
that causes of action do not "arise under" the laws of the United States unless they
involve the interpretation of congressional legislation. 17 Likewise, a case "arises
662 (3d Cir. 1950); Ratto v. Pacific Transport Lines, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 117 (N.D. Cal.
1955). See also Note, 66Harv. L. Rev. 315 (1952).
11. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917); Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Hawn,
346 U.S. 406 (1953).
12. The term "federal question" is here used in a substantive sense, as distinguished from
its use when speaking of jurisdictional requirements. In this sense it has also been called
"the federal common law." In the case of Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek
Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938), the same court that decided Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938), in ruling on a controversy between two states involving river waters said
that such a problem was: ". . . a question of 'federal common law' upon which neither the
statutes nor the decisions of either State can be conclusive." The courts have also referred to
such questions as dealing with areas "occupied" by the federal courts and Congress. In dis-
cussing whether the Erie doctrine should be applied in a case dealing with a defamatory
telegram sent from one state to another, a federal district court pointed out: "Notwith-
standing Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, . . . there still aist certain fields--and this is one
-where legal relations are governed by a 'federal common law . ..untrammelled by state
court decisions." O'Brien v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 113 F. 2d 539, 541 (1st Cir.
1940).
13. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1916).
14. 346 US. 406 (1953).
15. Id. at 409.
16. 194 F. 2d 834 (1st Cir. 1952).
17. Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112 (1936) ; Tennessee v. Davis, 100 Us.
257, 264 (1879). The Court in the Davis case said: "Cases arising under the laws of the
United States are such as grow out of the legislation of Congress... "
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under" the Constitution, within the meaning of the "arising under" grant, only where
the interpfetation of some constitutional provision is in issue,18 Moreover, it is sub-
mitted that the holdings of the Supreme Court in the Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen
and Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Hawn dealt with the "national law" in a substantive sense,
i.e., in the sense that it was the proper law to be applied, and cannot be properly ex-
tended to encompass "federal questions" considered as jurisdictional requirements.
This was the position assumed by the Third Circuit in Jordine v. Walling1 which held
that notwithstanding the presence of a substantive question involving the national
maritime law, diversity of citizenship is still required to entitle a suitor to take
advantage of the "saving to suitors" clause in a federal district court.
The court in the instant case arrived at the same conclusion, but apparently attached
little weight to the problem presented by the presence of a question involving the
"national law" in plaintiff's appeal, and confined itself to a discussion of the treat-
ment afforded the admiralty grant by the courts and Congress to determine congres-
sional intent. In so doing the court in effect dismissed plaintiff's appeal ivithout really
answering the question it raised, unless the court may be deemed to have answered
it by incorporating the holding of the Jordine case in its own.
In any event, the result reached would seem to be a just and equitable one. Allow-
ing a plaintiff, in a case such as this, to sue at admiralty or at law, at his option, would
do substantial violence to the basic foundation of the admiralty grant, and to a great
extent make the constitutional and congressional establishment of the admiralty juris-
diction superfluous legislation. In granting the admiralty jurisdiction, as distinct from
the law jurisdiction, it must certainly have been the legislative intent as pointed out
by Chief Justice Marshall,20 and reaffirmed by the court in the instant case, to keep
causes of action within its purview separate and distinct from those falling under the
common law grant. The purpose of the "saving to suitors" clause, as stated by the
court in the present case was to save common law remedies to those suitors who are
otherwise entitled to them, viz., those who can also show diversity. It is submitted
that the majority did not carry this reasoning to its logical conclusion. As the con-
curring opinion here maintained,2 ' if it was the purpose of Congress to keep separate
and distinct these two sources of jurisdiction, it would seem inconsistent to let the
suitor with a maritime claim into a federal court on its law side, even with diversity.
It would seem far more consistent to restrict the "saving to suitors" clause to allow
such a suitor his common law remedies in the state courts only. Whichever remedy
he chooses, a federal admiralty hearing or a common law trial in a state court, the
fact that the same substantive law must be applied to his cause, coupled with the fact
the case is subject to review by the Supreme Court, amply protects his federal rights.
LABOR LAw-UNION PRESIDENT NOT A "REPRESENTATIVE" WITHIN THE MEANINo
oF SECTION 302(b) oF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT.-Defendant, a
union official, was convicted on an indictment under section 302(b) of the Taft-
Hartley Act for wrongfully accepting money from corporations employing members
of his union. Upon appeal, held, one judge dissenting, reversed. Union officials are
not included within the term "representative" as used in section 302(b) of the act.
United States v. Ryan, 225 F. 2d 417 (2d Cir. 1955).
18. Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112 (1936); Bankers Mutual Casualty
Co. v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 192 U.S. 371, 381 (1904).
19. 185 F. 2d 662 (3d Cir. 1950).
20. American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 544 (1828).
21. 221 F. Zd at 621.
1956] RECENT DECISIONS 695
Section 302(b) of the Labor Management Relations Act provides that, "It shall
be unlawful for any representative of any employees ... employed in an industry
affecting commerce to receive or accept, from the employer of such employees any
money or other thing of value."' The section includes a like prohibition with respect
to employers making such payments,2 and also sets out exceptions to the prohibitions3
The exceptions pertain to (1) wages which an employer pays to a representative by
reason of his past or present services as an employee, (2) payments in settlement of
any legal claims or awards, (3) an ordinary market transaction, (4) payroll deductions
of union dues, and (5) payments by an employer to a welfare fund established and
administered according to the detailed basis provided for in this section.
The United States Court of Appeals, for the Third Circuit, in a case involving an
interpretation of this subsection4 reviewed the legislative history of the act in connec-
tion with the section and concluded that Congress' intention was to forbid money
from being paid to representatives of unions unless through a trust fund which meets
the requirements of the act. Again in United States v. Coyrnllyr, the defendant was
indicted under the same section and the Federal District Court for Minnesota, ruling
that the statute was not void by reason of vagueness, left no doubt that in its opinion
union officials are representatives within the meaning of the act.
The majority of the court in the instant case concluded that the term representa-
tive is used as a word of art which applies only to an exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative duly selected or designated for collective bargaining purposes. It recognized
that there may be labor organizations other than unions and also individuals designated
as exclusive bargaining representatives. The court reached this conclusion after con-
sidering section 501 of the act which reads in part: "When used in this chapter ....
(3) The terms . . . 'labor organization', 'representative' . . . shall have the same
meaning as when used in subchapter II of this chapter as amended by this chapter",0
and section 2 of the amended National Labor Relations Act which reads: "When used
in this subchapter.... (4) The term 'representatives' includes any individual or
labor organization." Since section 2(4) revealed only what the term includes, the
court felt constrained to look at each section of the National Labor Relations Act
in which the term was used in order to ascertain its meaning. Invariably the court
found those sections referring to exclusive bargaining representatives8 and therefore
reasoned that only such representatives were meant to be included in the term.
The dissent construed the section as applying to any representative of employees
whether authorized as exclusive bargaining agent or not. Particular emphasis was
placed on subdivisions (1) and (3) of section 302(c) which would, it was contended,
cover lawful payments to a union official as exceptions to the prohibition. Since the
officials are contemplated in the exceptions as being representatives they must also
have been contemplated in the prohibition. The majority disposed of this argument
1. 29 U.S.CA. § 186(b) (1947).
2. 29 U.S.CA. § 186(a) (1947).
3. 29 U.S.C.A. § 186(c) (1947).
4. United Marine Division, .LA. v. Essex Transp. Co., 216 F. 2d 410, 412 (3d Cir.
1954).
5. 129 F. Supp. 786, 789 (D. Minn. 1955).
6. 29 U.S.C.A. § 142(3) (1947).
7. 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(4) (1947).
8. Note however that § 159 (a) refers to representatives selected for the purposes of
collective bargaining. It would seem that the words 'for the purposes' etc. would be super-
fluous if representatives other than exclusive bargaining representatives were not contem-
plated by Congress. 29 US.CA. § 159(a) (1951).
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by explaining that those exceptions applied not to a union official but to individuals
who themselves were exclusive bargaining representatives.
The term "representative" includes any individual or labor organization. Because
it is possible, though rarely indeed is it true, that an individual can be an exclusive
bargaining representative, the court in the present case would confine the word
individual to that single application.
Section 2(4) of the National Labor Relations Act which defines representative
as "including any individual or labor organization" is patently general in its language.
In conformity with the rules of statutory interpretation, statutes, when phrased in
general language, should be given general application. No exceptions save those pro-
vided for should be read into a statute of such character Furthermore, the use of
the word any should reasonably be given some significance. The consequence of its
use is that there are no exceptions unless they are specifically given.' 0 As far as the
majority opinion is concerned section 2(4) might as well have been omitted, for It
has disregarded that section and has taken its definition of representative exclusively
from the various sections in which the term is used. The court has, in effect, construed
section 2(4) so as to have it read "the term representative includes any individual
or labor organization which has been duly selected as the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative." It is submitted that if Congress had intended the restrictive interpretation
which this court has given to section 302(b), it could quite plainly have added words
to that effect."
The defendant contended that the primary purpose of Congress in enacting section
302 was to render unlawful the creation of union welfare funds unless restricted as
provided in the act. Even admitting such argument, and that Congress expected
thereby to prevent the accumulation of huge "war chests" in union treasuries under
the guise of welfare funds, it is not unreasonable to say that in order to effectuate
that purpose Congress deemed it necessary to prohibit any sort of contributions to
representatives of employees, including union officials unless such payments came
under the exceptions enumerated. "Legislation, in order to effectuate its purposes,
may deal with relations beyond the immediate incidence of a mischief. If a particular
mischief is within the scope of Congressional power, wide discretion must be allowed
to Congress for dealing with it effectively.' 12 It is equally valid to argue that
Congress intended in one fell swoop, not only to regulate welfare funds, but also to
outlaw the acceptance by union officials of tribute from employers who seek to
minimize "disputes," or have contract violations ignored, or, in short, to "harmonize"
labor-management relations through the purchase of disloyalty. Most certainly the
"gift-giving" by employers to union officials will reduce the effectiveness of collective
bargaining machinery. One of the major purposes of the Taft-Hartley Act is to
preserve the integrity of the labor-management relationship, which can realistically
9. Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 611 (1944); Adams Express
Co. v. Kentucky, 238 U.S. 190, 199 (1915); Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co. v.
Mottley, 219 U.S. 467, 479 (1911); United States v. National City Lines, 90 F. Supp. 734,
741 (S.D. Cal. 1948).
10. Ex Parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 58 (1949); United States v. National City Lines,
supra note 9, at 742.
11. Commissioner v. Beck's Estate, 129 F. 2d 243, 245 (2d Cir. 1942). In this case, Judge
Frank, who wrote the opinion for the majority in the instant case, said: "The familiar 'easy-
to-say-so-if-that-is-what-was-meant' rule of statutory interpretation has full force here."
("here" meaning the Second Circuit).
12. American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 419 (1950).
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be tarnished by the individual representatives whether their corrupt acts be for their
own personal enrichment or that of the unions they represent.
In a decision subsequent to the present case, United States v. Brentan, the same
District Court that decided the Cornely case expressly refused to go along with the
majority in the principal case and adopted the view that Congress intended the section
to cover any responsible representative of labor including union officials. Such a view
is reflective of the language employed, more consonant with the broad Congressional
purpose and more consistent with the legislative history.
Where a union is designated as the exclusive bargaining representative it is
prohibited from accepting any money or thing of value from an employer. But a
union can act only through its officials, and yet the instant court would permit the
officials to accept from an employer under identical circumstances money or other
things of value so long as the entire union membership does not share in the booty.
Looked at in this way it is difficult to find logic or wisdom in the court's decision.
The acts' "Findings and declarations of policy"'14 specifically cite the necessity of
eliminating certain unconscionable practices by labor organizations and their officers.
If the majority's restrictive interpretation is to prevail, it will provide judicial
immunity to at least one such unconscionable practice. Is this what Congress
intended?*
PARENT-CHrrDn--EFrECT OP INFANT'S MENTAL ATTITuDE 3N NEGrLECTr CHL PRO-
CEEDING.-The county health officer brought a petition in Children's Court to have a
twelve-year-old boy, who was afflicted with a harelip and cleft palate, declared a
neglected child and to have his custody transferred temporarily from his parents to
the Commissioner of Social Welfare for the purpose of consenting to remedial surgery.
The child's father objected to surgery and preferred to rely on "natural forces" to
effect a cure. After all phases of the surgical and postoperative treatment had been
explained to the infant by medical experts, the boy declined surgical treatment. There-
upon the Children's Court, noting that the boy had been imbued with dread and
distrust of surgery since childhood and was psychologically unprepared for such an
operation, denied the petition. The Appellate Division refused to recognize the child's
ability to reach such a decision and granted the petition. Upon appeal, held, three
judges dissenting, reversed. Although the Children's Court has the power to order
an operation over parental objection, since the child's condition was not emergent, the
discretion of the trier of the facts should be preferred. It re Sciferth, 309 N.Y. 80,
127 N.E. 2d 820 (1955).
Implicit in the relationship of parent to child is the concept of parentum auctoritas
which guarantees to the parent the right to educate and provide for the child without
external interference. At common law this doctrine was rigidly applied.' Even where
the life of the child was at stake, courts were powerless to order surgical or medical
treatment over the parents' objection. 2 Nor was a manslaughter conviction possible
13. 134 F. Supp. 42 (D. Iinn. 1955).
14. 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 (1947).
* Reversed by the Supreme Court since this writing. 24 U.S.L. Week 4101 (US. Feb. 28,
1956 (No. 281)).
1. But not so absolutely as in early Roman law where the father could kill the child with
immunity from the law. Custody and Control of Children, Comment, S Fordham L. Rev.
460, 461 (1936).
2. In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P. 2d 765 (1942); Cf. Matter of Rotkowitz,
175 Misc. 948, 25 N.Y.S. 2d 624 (Dom. Rel Ct. 1941).
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when a parent, on religious grounds, refused to allow medical treatment for a child
who subsequently died for lack of treatment.3
However, the supremacy of parental authority was gradually brought within reason-
able bounds. The power of the state to legislate for the welfare of children is recog-
nized.4 Statutory enactments permitting punishment of parents who neglect the
health of the child have been upheld.5 Today in at least four states the courts are no
longer powerless to prevent the death of a child because of the parents' refusal of
medical or surgical treatment.6
New York has perhaps the most liberal legislation on the subject. The Children's
Court Act, enacted in 1922, defines a neglected child as one ". . . whose parents,
guardian or custodian neglect or refuse, when able to do so, to provide necessary
medical, surgical, institutional or hospital care for such child." 7 Exclusive jurisdiction
is vested in the Children's Court of all cases involving neglected children.8 Exercise
of its powers to order an examination of such a child and to provide necessary medical,
surgical or institutional care is discretionary with the court.0
Under the provisions of the act, the constitutionality of which has been upheld,10
surgical treatment has been ordered over the objection of the parents in an emergency
situation where the infant's life was at stake. 1 Other jurisdictions with statutes
similar to New York's have ruled it immaterial that the treatment ordered is contrary
to the religious beliefs of the parents.'2 This question has never been adjudicated in
New York, and the court in the case under review did not consider the father's
objections to be based on religious grounds, but simply an expression of his personal
philosophy. Nor need the life of the infant be at stake before the court will act. In
3. Cawley, Criminal Liability in Faith Healing, 39 Minn. L. Rev. 48, 54 (1954).
4. Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (protective labor regulations); Goldberg v.
Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 185 App. Div. 222, 172 N.Y. Supp. 828 (2d Dep't 1918)
(parents bound to observe statutes against work by young children); De Lease v. Nolan,
185 App. Div. 82, 172 N.Y. Supp. 552 (3d Dep't 1918) (compulsory school attendance laws).
5. N.Y. Penal Law § 482 (1) formerly Penal Code § 287 (1) (1881), People v. Pierson,
176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903); Cal. Penal Code § 270 (1923), People v. Nelson, 42
Cal. App. 2d 83, 108 P. 2d 51 (1940); Okla. Penal Code § 852 formerly Comp. Laws of
1909 § 2369, Owens v. State, 6 Okla. Crim. 110, 116 Pac. 345 (1911).
6. People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E. 2d 769, cert. denied, 344
U.S. 824 (1952); Morrison v. State, 252 S.W. 2d 97 (Mo. App. 1952); Matter of Vasko,
238 App. Div. 128, 263 N.Y. Supp. 552 (2d Dep't 1933); Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W. 2d
812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947). But for a situation which can render the courts even in one of
these states powerless to prevent the child's death, see Cawley, Criminal Liability In Faith
Healing, 39 Minn. L. Rev. 48, 62, 63 (1954).
.7. N.Y. Children's Ct. Act § 2(4)(e) (1930); N.Y.C. Dom. Re]. Ct. Act § 2(17(g)
(1945). The New York Children's Court Act embraces the entire state of New York
except for New York City and two counties which are covered by other legislation con-
taining substantially similar provisions.
8. N.Y. Children's Ct. Act § 6(1)(g) (1930); N.Y.C. Dom. Re]. Ct. Act § 61(1)(d)
(1944).
9. N.Y. Children's Ct. Act § 24 (1930); N.Y.C. Dom. Rel. Ct. Act § 85(1) (1941).
10. Matter of Vasko, 238 App. Div. 128, 263 N.Y. Supp. 552 (2d Dep't 1933).
11. Ibid.
12. People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E. 2d 769, cert, denied, 344 U.S.
824 (1952); Morrison v. State, 252 S.W. 2d 97 (Mo. App. 1952); Mitchell v. Davis, 205
S.W. 2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
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Matter of Rotkowitz,' 3 as in the instant case, the life of the child was not endangered
but remedial surgery was becoming more difficult with time. There was little or no
doubt as to the eventual success of the operation. Over the parents' objection surgery
was ordered to correct and arrest a progressive deformity resulting from polio. Addi-
tionally, the disorder need not be a physical one; a neglected child may be removed
to a hospital for psychiatric study without the parent's consent.14 However, the
Court of Appeals has insisted that parental guardianship should not be interfered with
except where the physical, mental or moral health of the child is seriously endan-
gered.' 5 Thus the power of the courts is circumscribed to protect the family from
unwarranted interference.
Under the provisions of the New York act, the infant's consent to medical treat-
ment is not necessary. It is his inability to give legal consent which necessitates the
proceedings and the transfer of his custody to a guardian, who is capable of giving
such consent. Therefore, what, if any, merit should the infant's convictions be given
in the determination of the proceedings? This new issue was raised in the present
case, where the Children's Court, after noting that the father's objections did not
preclude a court order for surgery, left the decision to the infant.'0
The minority of the Court of Appeals argued that the court has the responsibility
and duty under law to render the decision and this responsibility should not be passed
on to an infant who, whatever his intelligence, has neither the maturity nor experience
to cope with such a momentous problem. The fact that the infant is willing to let
his parents do as they choose in caring for him, should not be controlling in deciding
whether they are in fact guilty of neglect or not.
However, the purpose of the legislation in question is to advance and promote the
welfare of the infant and the court, vested as it is with broad discretionary power,
must take cognizance of the psychological aspects of a case, if its decisions are to be
truly for the infant's welfare. In the principal case the infant had a sincere distrust
and fear of surgery. Treatment called for three operations and a lengthy postoperative
speech therapy course. His wholehearted cooperation was a prerequisite for the
success of the speech course. In this situation, with all its psychological ramifications,
it might well be that the lack of the child's consent would doom the postoperative
therapy to failure. If that be so, the court is exercising sound discretion in refusing
to compel medical treatment. However, when the court decides, as the Children's
Court did in the instant case, to leave the ultimate decision with the child it is
abdicating the duty imposed upon it by statute.
The determination, however, is firmly justified, as the majority of the Court of
Appeals pointed out, because of the psychological factors involved. But would this
result be extended to a case where the infant refuses to consent though the success
of the treatment does not depend on his proper mental attitude or cooperation? While
fairly debatable, such an extension would appear unwarranted for, irrespective of the
infant's convictions, the treatment would promote his welfare.
13. 175 Misc. 948, 25 N.Y.S. 2d 624 (Dom. Re. Ct. 1941).
14. In re Carstairs, 115 N.Y.S. 2d 314 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1952).
15. People ex re. Sisson v. Sisson, 271 N.Y. 285, 2 N.E. 2d 660 (1936).
16. In re Seiferth, 127 N.Y.S. 2d 63, 65 (Children's Ct. 1954). The judge in his
order of Jan. 5, 1954, wrote, "It is the studied conviction of this court ... that the child
should be given the opportunity of making his own decision, without interference from his
father... 2. The practical difficulty of such an order is that the decision of a twelve-year-
old child is bound to be influenced by his parents. The child on Feb. 11, 1954, stated to




PATENTS-STANDARD OF INVENTION UNDER ACT Or 1952.- Plaintiff brought an
action for infringement of a patent granted on a process for the coating of optical
lenses with a transparent film to prevent reflection. The unique portion of this process
was keeping the surface of the optical element hot while the vaporization of the
inorganic salt was taking place. The District Court granted an injunction against
further infringement and damages for the interim period, holding that the plaintiff's
process had not been "in public use or on sale nor had the invention been made by
another prior to the plaintiff." Upon appeal, held, affirmed. Under the changed stan-
dard of invention embodied in the Patent Act of 1952, plaintiff's contribution or
"added step" was sufficient to support a patent. Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical
Company, 224 F. 2d 530 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 24 U.S.L. Week 3156 (U.S.
Dec. 5, 1955) (No. 379).
Prior to the Patent Act of 1952,1 there was no statutory test for the determination
of whether an invention was a sufficient contribution to prior art to support a patent.
Case authority on this point commenced with the Supreme Court decision in Hotchkiss
v. Greenwood.2 This landmark case decided that "unless more ingenuity and skill in
applying the old method ... [were necessary] than were possessed by an ordinary
mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absence of that degree of skill
and ingenuity which constitute an essential element of every invention." a Decisions
are legion revising and rephrasing this principle; and from time to time various other
terms and purported rules have been excerpted from these holdings. Within recent
years the phrases "flash of genius" or "flash of creative genius," as enunciated in
Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp.,4 have been used to define the
mental evolution necessary for a patentable invention. This catch phrase was subject
to much criticism,5 but read in the context of the Cuno decision it loses much of its
startling force and it would appear that no substitution for the Hotchkiss test was
intended. Indeed, the court in the Cuno case reaffirmed the doctrine of Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood.6 The "flash of genius" concept was by no means the only "test" employed
during the decade or more preceding the enactment of the Patent Act of 1952,7 but
invariably the cases deciding a question of patentability cited the Hotchkiss case.
Upon examination of these cases it becomes apparent that judicial confusion resulted
from the periodic rephrasing of the standard test. The expressions used in rephrasing
were often interpreted as new and distinct "tests" but viewed from a retrospective
vantage point appear to be merely attempts to define the indefinable. Generally, the
underlying principle that invention demanded something more than that expected of
one skilled in the art remained in force, and its effect was felt either expressly or
impliedly during the period of so-called strict application of patentability rules.
Such was the state of the law in 1952 when Congress enacted the present Patent
Act.3 Section 103 of the 1952 Act provides that a patent may not be obtained if the
1. 35 U.S.C.A. (1952).
2. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850).
3. Id. at 266.
4. 314 U.S. 84 (1941).
5. Chicago Steel Foundry Co. v. Burnside Steel Foundry Co., 132 F. 2d .812 (7th Cir.
1943).
6. 314 U.S. at 90, 92.
7. Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F. 2d 632, 639 (2d Cir. 1942); In re Replogle,
62 F. 2d 188 (Ct. of Cus. and Patent Appeals 1932) ; United Chromium, Inc. v. International
Silver Co., 60 F. 2d 913 (2d Cir. 1932).
8. U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2394 (1952).
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difference between the subject matter sought to be patented and prior art is such that
the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter pertains;
patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.9
Section 103 is the crux of the present case, where the court thought it probable that
the claims under litigation would have been invalid but for the change in the patent-
ability test which the court found in section 103. Did Congress intend section 103
as a new test of patentability?
The purpose of the legislation, as set forth in the Committee Report,10 is "to revise
and codify the laws relating to patents. .. ."I' In elaborating upon the purpose of
the bill, the Committee Report refers to "changes in substantive statutory law,"'
not pre-existing nonstatutory patent law. Prior to the 1952 Act the test of patent-
ability was not statutory but judicial in nature.
The report later refers specifically to section 103 as the codification of "a condition
which exists in the law and has existed for more than 100 years . . .",13 viz., the
Hotchkiss case. Again, in the appendix to the report, reference is made to section
103 identifying the codified test with the year 1850, the date of the Hotchkiss case.1 4
9. "A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary
skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived
by the manner in which the invention was made." 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (1952).
10. Senate Rep. No. 1979, June 27, 1952. House Rep. No. 7794, May 12, 1942.
11. See note 8 supra.
12. "Although the principle purpose of the Bill (HR07794) is the codification of title
35, United States Code, and involves simplification and clarification of language and
arrangement, and elimination of obsolete and redundant provisions, there are a number of
changes in substantive statutory law... The major changes or innovations in the title
consist of incorporating a requirement for invention in § 103 and the judicial doctrine of
contributory infringement in § 271." U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2397 (1952).
13. "Section 103, for the first time in our statute, provides a condition which exists in
the law and has existed for more than 100 years, but only by reason of decisions of the
courts. An invention which has been made, and which is new in the sense that the same
thing has not been made before, may still not be patentable if the difference between the new
thing and what was known before is not considered sufficiently great to warrant a patent.
That has been expressed in a large variety of ways in decisions of the courts and in writings.
Section 103 states this requirement in the title. It refers to the difference between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art, meaning what was known before as
described in section 102. If this difference is such that the subject matter as a whole would
have been obvious at the time to a person skilled in the art, then the subject matter cannot
be patented.
"That provision paraphrases language which has often been used in decisions of the
courts, and the section is added to the statute for uniformity and definiteness. This
section should have a stabilizing effect and minkie great departures which have appeared
in some cases." U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2399, 2400 (1952).
14. "Section 103-New Section
"There is no provision corresponding to the first sentence explicitly stated in the present
statutes, but the refusal of patents by the Patent Office, and the holding of patents invalid
by the courts, on the ground of lack of invention or lack of patentable novelty has been
followed since at least as early as 1850. This paragraph is added with the view that an
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It follows, therefore, that Congress considered the Hotchkiss test as the one still
judicially applied at the time the Committee Report was written. It is equally clear
that this was the test which Congress intended to embody in section 103. The simi-
larity between the wordage of the Hotchkiss test and that used in section 103 lends
weight to this interpretation. Before the present case there were several decisions to
the effect that section 103 was merely a codification of pre-existing law and that no
change in the test was intended.' 5
The present court held that the departures referred to in the Committee Report 10
must be those in the direction of strictness which it says, has occurred in the last
20 years.' 7 This seems improbable. The determination of whether an innovation
would be obvious to a mechanic skilled in the art, must, of necessity, rest within the
sound discretion of the court. It is similar to the "due care" or "reasonable man"
rule in that it varies with the circumstances and the times.18 In the normal course
of the development of an art, the test of obviousness must become more stringent
as those engaged become more expert and the fund of knowledge concerning that art
increases. The test remains constant, but its application changes as technological
knowledge becomes available to more people and the general levels of education
become higher. 19 We have a joinder of two distinct concepts. First the test of
patentability itself, and second the application of the test. The application of a
specific test of patentability may be strict or lenient according to the temper of the
times, but the basic standard of invention remains constant. Different tests of patent-
ability will result in varying basic standards of invention. If, in order to be patentable,
the innovation must literally result from a "flash of creative genius, '20 this would
preclude many inventions which would be patentable under the Hotchkiss case. So,
too, when this court, in a prior case, hesitated "to mistake invention for the slow
but inevitable progress of industry through trial and error," 21 it substituted a different
test from that enunciated in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood and required by section 103.
In fact, this latter distinction was expressly rejected by the second sentence of section
explicit statement in the statute may have some stabilizing effect, and also to serve as a
basis for the addition at a later time of some criteria which may be worked out.
"The second sentence states that patentability as to this requirement is not to be negatived
by the manner in which the invention was made, that is, it is immaterial whether It
resulted from long toil and experimentation or from a flash of genius." U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News at 2410, 2411 (1952).
15. Wasserman v. Burgess & Blacher Co., 217 F. 2d 402 (1st Cir. 1954); Vincent v.
Suni-Citrus Products Co., 215 F. 2d 305 (5th Cir. 1954) ; Interstate Rubber Products Corp.
v. Radiator Specialty Co., 214 F. 2d 546 (4th Cir. 1954); K. Tourneau, Inc. v. Tishman &
Lipp, 211 F. 2d 240 (2d Cir. 1954); United Mattress Machinery Co., Inc. v. Handy Button
Machine Co. 207 F. 2d 1 (3rd Cir. 1953); General Motors Corp. v. Estate Stove Co., 203
F. 2d 912 (6th Cir. 1953); Stanley Works v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 203 F. 2d 846 (3rd Cir.
1953); Carlson & Suliman, Inc. v. Bigelow & Dowse Co., 202 F. 2d 654 (1st Cir. 1953);
Application of O'Keefe, 202 F. 2d 767 (U.S. Ct. of Cus. & Patent Appeals 1953).
16. See note 14 supra.
17. Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 224 F. 2d 530, 535 (2d Cir. 1955).
18. Brown & Sharp Mfg. Co. v. Kar Engineering Company, 154 F. 2d 48 (1st Cir. 1946),
cert. denied, 328 U.S. 869 (1946), rehearing denied, 329 U.S. 822 (1946).
19. Chicago Steel Foundry Company v. Burnside Steel Foundry Company, 132 F. 2d 812
(7th Cir. 1943).
20. Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941).
21. Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F. 2d 632, 636 (2d Cir. 1942).
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103.22 To this extent the section did invoke a change in the prior test of patentability
as applied by this court.
In the instant case the court recognizes that "the [Supreme] Court never formally
abjured . . . the test set forth in the Hotchkiss case" and notes that section 103 is
"substantially in ipsissimis verbis"23 with the test set forth in that early decision.
However, the court finds "in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition
to insist upon a stricter test of invention that it used to apply . . . indubitably
stricter than that defined in Section 103. -"24 The court fails or refuses to recognize
the distinction between the application of a test and the test itself.
The Supreme Court in the Cuno case was not accepting the historical test of patent-
ability as controlling and authoritative2 5 and at the same time applying a stricter
test. In keeping with the times, it was insisting upon a stricter application of the
traditional test as set forth in the Hotchkiss case. If Congress intended to lower the
standards of invention or to change the test of patentability, as is contended by this
court, how futile would be the enactment into statutory form of that very test which
the Supreme Court had continued to find authoritative throughout the period of so-
called strictness. Clearly the intention was to codify what Congress understood was
existing law with the purpose of preventing large scale judicial desertions to a
spurious test prompted by "catch phrase" such as "flash of creative genius."25
As the test has remained the same, the problem for the court in this case was the
application of the traditional test, an area which, by its very nature, remains beyond
the purview of Congress and within the sound discretion of the courts. This applica-
tion should have been consistent with that degree of strictness which this court has
"generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court."2 7
PROCESS-SERICE BY PUBLICATION-MONEY-ONLY Acno.N-DommcmAmY DErMMD-
ANT-IN Rx JmU rISDICIN.-In an action for conversion of money plaintiff, alleging
defendant to be a resident of New York State who had been absent from the state
for more than six months, had obtained in December 1942 a warrant of attachment
and in January 1943 an order permitting service of the summons by publication.
Defendant, who in fact had been absent for more than six months, and who had not
designated anyone to accept a summons on his behalf, had a default judgment entered
against him in March 1943. When the defendant inherited some real property in
1954, the plaintiff attempted to have that property applied to the default judgment.
Appearing specially, the defendant alleged he was not a resident of the State of New
York and that as a result personal jurisdiction was not obtained over him. Hcld, the
default judgment was limited, the action being for money only, to the property
attached prior to its issuance, as the court had mere in rem jurisdiction. The question
as to the defendant's domicile is immaterial. Langer v. Wield, 207 Misc. 826, 140
N.Y.S. 2d 298 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
A state has the power to grant its courts in personam jurisdiction over absent
22. 'Tatentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was
made." 35 U.S.CA. § 103 (1952).
23. 224 F. 2d at 536.
24. Id. at 535.
25. See note 20 supra.
26. 314 US. at 91.
27. 224 F. 2d at 535.
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domiciliaries with substituted service or personal service without the state,1 and in
fact New York has so conferred this jurisdiction. 2 The only restriction upon the
state's power in this regard appears to be that, in order to safeguard due process, the
constructive service employed must reasonably be calculated to give the defendant
actual notice of the action against him.3 New York's method of service by publica-
tion4 satisfies this restriction.5 The defendant, on the other hand, need not reccivo
actual notice for the court to acquire jurisdiction to proceed. 0
Section 232 of the Civil Practice Act sets out four types of actions in which
service by publication may be made. Included are matrimonial actions, and actions
to recover a sum of money only.7 Section 232-a enumerates those defendants against
whom service by publication may be ordered. Among the defendants included are:
nonresident natural persons, residents who have concealed themselves to avoid service,
and residents who have been absent from the state for more than six months without
having designated a person upon whom service may be made in their behalf.8 It is
provided, in section 233, that in all cases where service by publication is ordered, the
defendant may be served personally without the state, which service is equivalent
to notice by publication.9 Section 235, however, states that a defendant in any type
of action as set forth by section 232, or a domiciliary defendant, may be served
personally without the state without an order.
In a money-only action, before service by publication can be authorized, an attach-
ment of a defendant's property within the state is required, regardless of whether
the defendant is, or is not, a domiciliary of New York.'0 Such service, as seen in the
present case, confers in rem jurisdiction regardless of the defendant's domicile.
Where a domiciliary defendant 1" is served personally without the state, without a
prior order authorizing publication, the court acquires in personam jurisdiction. 12
This applies to money-only actions as well as matrimonial actions.18 It would seem
that a plaintiff who first secured an order for publication, and then had the defendant
served personally without the state, should not be in a worse position than a plaintiff
who had the domiciliary defendant served personally without the state without an
order for publication.' 4 Should not, therefore, such service grant the court in per-
sonam jurisdiction? Yet such service is equivalent to service by publication 15 and
1. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
2. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 230 (Supp. 1955); Rawstorne v. Maguire, 265 N.Y. 204, 192
N.E. 294 (1934; N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 235 (Supp. 1955); Gordy v. Gordy, 201 Misc. 1039,
113 N.Y.S. 2d 296 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
3. See note 1 supra.
4. N.Y. Rules Civ. Prac. 50 (1945), 51 (1935), 52 (1937).
5. Valz v. Sheepshead Bay Bungalow Corp., 249 N.Y. 122, 163 N.E. 124 (1928), cert.
denied, 278 U.S. 647 (1928).
6. United States Trust Co. v. United States Fire Ins. Co. (Matter of the Empire City
Bank), 18 N.Y. 199 (1858).
7. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 232 (1), (3) (Supp. 1955).
8. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 232-a (5), (7), (8) (Supp. 1955).
9. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 233 (Supp. 1955).
10. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 232, 232-a, 232-b (Supp. 1955).
11. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Ebsary Gypsum Co. v. Ruby, 256 N.Y. 406,
176 N.E. 820 (1931).
12. Sivakoff v. Sivakoff, 104 N.Y.S. 2d 174 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
13. Sperry v. Fliegers, 194 Misc. 438, 86 N.Y.S. 2d 830 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
14. Johnson v. Johnson, 67 N.Y.S. 2d 886 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
15. See note 9 supra.
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service by publication in a money-only action grants in rem jurisdiction rather than
personal jurisdiction.
In Dirksen v. Dirsen L6 an action for separation and alimony, service by publica-
tion was held to give the court in personam jurisdiction over the absent defendant,
a domiciliary of New York, for the purpose of granting alimony. Since alimony is
a money judgment,17 why should the court have personal jurisdiction over a defend-
ant when plaintiff couples a money action with a separation action, but not when a
money action alone is tried?
An attempt was made in 1945 to give the courts in personam jurisdiction over an
absent domiciliary in a money-only action where service was by publication.18 This
attempt was vetoed,' 9 presumably as being inequitable to a defendant. But in the
case of a resident defendant, in a money-only action, who successfully avoids personal
service, and with no known property in the state, a plaintiff is without a remedy.
Where does equity lie in this situation?
One is inclined to think that the veto was invoked without present knowledge of
the more than adequate relief that existed then, as now, for deserving defendants in
setting aside default judgments when service is by publication in its literal sense:ni
If, however, the relief was thought to be inadequate, an examination of the law will
show such a position to be untenable. Nothing need be said about a defendant who
in such a case receives actual notice and simply chooses to ignore the action pending
against him. Section 217 of the Civil Practice Act gives a defendant, or his representa-
tive, the right upon showing good cause to defend an action at any time prior to the
final judgment.21 A defendant or his representative must also be allowed, except in
divorce actions or where expressly forbidden by law, after showing good cause, to
defend an action after final judgment, as long as the defendant acts within one year
after personal service of a written notice of the default judgment, or in the absence
of such notice within seven years after the filing of the judgment roll. Further, for
such a defendant, unlike one who has been served personally, it will usually, i.e., in
the absence of proved actual knowledge or proof that he should have reasonably
anticipated the action, be deemed that he had a good cause for defaulting.2 Of
course such a defendant must show a defense based on the merits of the action.n-
The court has a wide discretion in construing good cause,24 which construction should
be liberal.2 5
The consequences of the law with regard to service by publication in a money-
only action are far from clear, with leading writers calling for an appellate decision
16. 72 N.Y.S. 2d S65 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
17. Shepherd v. Shepherd, 51 Misc. 418, 100 N.Y. Supp. 401 (Sup. CL 1906), aflF'd
without opinion, 117 App. Div. 924,103 N.Y. Supp. 1141 (1st Dep't 1907).
18. The New York Judicial Council recommended, "That section 232 be amended to
provide that where the defendant is a resident of the State and the complaint demands
judgment for a sum of money only, an order for service of summons by publication is
authorized without requiring a prior warrant of attachment and levy." Eleventh Annual
Report of the New York Judicial Council 195 (1945).
19. Twelfth Annual Report of the New York Judicial Council 58 (1946).
20. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 217 (1914).
21. Ibid.
22. Carpenter v. Weatherwax, 277 App. Div. 264, 98 N.Y.S. 2d 673 (3d Dep't 1950).
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Matter of fars, 203 M isc. 102, 115 N.Y.S. 2d 643 (Surr. CL 1952).
19561
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
and stating that the law contains an incongruity.20 These facts, coupled with the
myriad problems presented by the law as it exists and the adequate relief already
afforded defendants, clearly indicate that the legislature should amend the Civil
Practice Act so as to grant the courts in personam jurisdiction over an absent domi-
ciliary, where service is by publication, in a money-only action.
TORTS-NEGLIGENcE-DAMIAGE TO ABUTTING OWNER'S PROPERTY NOT A FORESEE-
ABLE CONSEQUENCE OF CITY'S FAILURE TO REPAIR DEFECTIVE STREETM-The street
upon which plaintiff's building abutted contained holes which had been left in non-
repair for intervals ranging from one day to several weeks over a period of a year.
Face brick from one of the building's walls had fallen as the result of exceedingly
heavy shocks and consequent vibrations caused by the impacts of heavy vehicular
traffic in the street. The presence of one of the holes had been brought to the atten-
tion of the City by the plaintiff three to four weeks prior to the occurrence of the
damage. The trial court entered judgment for the property damage. On appeal, held,
two justices dissenting, judgment reversed. Though the injury was caused by the
unrepaired holes, in the absence of more specific notice of the possible consequences,
this result was not within the risk to be foreseen by the City. Trent v. City of Now
York, 286 App. Div. 479, 144 N.Y.S. 2d 625 (1st Dep't 1955).
The rights of abutting owners with respect to municipal corporations include the
incorporeal hereditaments of light, air, and access (i.e., ingress to and egress from the
property).1 These rights may be regarded as easements appurtenant to municipally-
owned streets and parks which are inherent in the ownership of the abutting property.2
For an actionable invasion of an abutting owner's incorporeal rights as a consequence
of a defective street, it must have occurred as a result of the use of the adjoining
highway for travel.3 Incorporeal rights may also be intruded upon by a municipality's
failure to carry out the making of public improvements in a careful manner.4 A
municipality will be liable for injuries to real property which involve the impairment
of the structural integrity of buildings or the condition of the land itself. For example
municipalities have been held liable for interference with the lateral support of build-
ings while making public improvements. 5 Liability has also been imposed for damages
26. Finn, Constructive Service of Process in New York, 18 Fordbam L. Rev. 242 (1949);
3 Carmody-Wait 215 (1953).
1. Anzalone v. Metropolitan District Commission, 257 Mass. 32, 153 N.E. 325 (1926)
(access); Farrell v. Rose, 253 N.Y. 73, 170 N.E. 498 (1930) (access); Kelbro, Inc. v.
Myrick, 113 Vt. 64, 30 Atl. 2d 527 (1943) (view); St. Peter's Italian Church v. New York,
261 App. Div. 96, 24 N.Y.S. 2d 759 (4th Dep't 1941) (access); McCutcheon v. Terminal
Station Commission, 168 App. Div. 301, 154 N.Y. Supp. 711 (4th Dep't 1915) (a general
discussion of incorporeal rights); Hallock v. Scheyer, 33 Hun III (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. T.
1884) (light and air).
2. Mitchell v. Thomas, 91 Mont. 370, 8 Pac. 2d 639 (1932) ; Kernochan v. N.Y. Elevated
R.R. Co., 128 N.Y. 559, 29 N.E. 65 (1891).
3. McKenna v. Andreassi, 292 Mass. 213, 197 N.E. 879 (1935); Johnson v. City of New
York, 186 N.Y. 139, 78 N.E. 715 (1906).
4. Village of Sand Point v. Doyle, 14 Idaho 749, 95 Pac. 945 (1908); Kane v. N.Y.
Elevated R.R. Co., 125 N.Y. 164, 26 N.E. 278 (1891); Clymer v. Roberts 220 Pa. 162, 69
Atl. 548 (1908).
5. Crane v. City of Harrison, 40 Idaho 229, 232 Pac. 578 (1925); Matter of Rapid
Transit R.R. Commissioners, 197 N.Y. 81, 90 N.E. 456 (1909).
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to an abutting owner's property resulting from percolating water caused by the negli-
gent repair of a sewer.6 In a Pennsylvania case the City of Philadelphia was charged
with liability for damages caused by its failure to remove combustible rubbish from
a street; when the rubbish ignited it and burned the abutting owner's building.7 In
Illinois. liability was imposed where a city was repairing a street through a sub-
contractor, and where the abutting building was damaged by vibrations resulting from
the impact of a wrecking ball against the pavement.8 Of the cases that have dealt
with vibration-damage most of them have implied that the injuries sustained would
have been actionable had negligence on the part of the defendants been proved.9
The court in the instant case conceded that the action was the first time that a
suit had been brought in a New York court attempting to hold a municipality liable
for injuries to abutting property caused by the impact and resultant vibrations of
motor vehicle traffic on a defective street. The case was decided on the basis that the
injury to the property was not a foreseeable consequence with respect to the City's
omission.10 The doctrine of foreseeability in negligence actions as it was developed
and refined in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. is characterized in the following statement
from the majority opinion in that decision: "The risk reasonably to be perceived de-
fines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to
others within the range of apprehension."' This statement is a precise formula for
approaching a negligence action from its most logical beginning, that is, from the
underlying requisite, duty. However, authorities have expressed the view that the
foreseeability formula is not a complete and final formulization of the methods for
determining duty.12 Although foreseeability has been criticized when regarded as an
all-inclusive formula, it has been applied in New York decisions subsequent to the
Palsgraf case and represents New York law on the point of determining duty.
Directly related to the issue of foreseeability in the instant case was the question
of notice to the City. The general rule is that if a defect in a street which a munici-
pality has failed to repair has caused injury, liability will not be imposed unless the
municipality had actual notice of the defect or was aware of such facts and circum-
stances as would lead a person to knowledge of the defect by the use of reasonable
diligence.1 3 The underlying reason for requiring a municipality to have notice of the
defect is that it is not the insurer of persons or property on the highway or property
adjacent thereto.1 4 Where only one inference can be drawn from the facts, the ques-
6. Schumacher v. City of New York 166 N.Y. 103, 59 N.E. 773 (1901).
7. Charles Eneu Johnson Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 236 Pa. 510, 84 At. 1014 (1912).
8. Mlacer v. O'Brien, 356 fL1. 486, 190 N.E. 904 (1934).
9. Euwema Co. v. McKay Engineering and Construction Co.,316 lL App. 650,45 N.E.2d
555 (1942) (a compressor caused the vibration-damage, negligence not proved); Howard v.
Robinette, 122 Ind. App. 66, 99 N.E. 2d 110 (1951) (vibration-damage caused by machinery
in a municipally-owned electric plant, negligence not proved).
10. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
11. Id. at 344, 162 N.E. at 100.
12. "The attempt to sustain the foreseeability of harm ... as adequate for the deter-
mination of negligence cases, is futile. Howsoever far these elastic terms may be stretched,
there are too many cases which go beyond their bounds." Green, The Palsgraf Case, 30
Colum. L. Rev. 789, 800 (1930). "Foreseeability of risk ... carries only an illusion of
certainty in defining the consequences for which the defendant will be liable.' Prosser,
Palsgraf Revisited, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 19 (1953).
13. Requa v. City of Rochester, 45 N.Y. 129 (1871); Hall v. Triboro Coach Corp., 274
App. Div. 803, 79 N.Y.S. 2d 777 (2d Dep't 1948).
14. Jones v. City of Binghamton, 198 App. Div. 183, 190 N.Y. Supp. 542 (3d Dep't
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tion of notice is for the court; however, where different conclusions can be drawn from
the facts the question of notice is for the jury.'5 In the instant case the City had no
actual notice of the particular consequence to the owner's building that would result
from its failure to repair the street. It is submitted, however, that whether or not it
should have been charged with such knowledge by reason of the circumstances sur-
rounding the defect, was properly a jury question and consequently the verdict of the
trial court should not have been disturbed. The facts of the present decision show
that (a) the street had been left in non-repair for nearly a year;' G (b) the City had
actual notice of one of the more serious defects; (c) the general nature of the defects
might reasonably have been considered serious; (d) the nature of the use of the
street, namely that it was regularly trafficked by heavily laden trucks, when con-
sidered with the duration and nature of the defects, might be regarded as a strong
element for concluding constructive notice of the possible consequences. In any
event, if reasonable men could differ as to whether or not the risk to the plaintiff's
building was foreseeable, it could not be said as a matter of law that the City should
or should not have anticipated the injury. The criterion that "varying inferences"
determine what matters are peculiarly within the province of the jury is well-
established law in New York.' 7
In the principal case the court concurred with the jury's conclusion that the injury
to the owner's building was caused by the unrepaired holes. Causation in fact is not
the exclusive element in negligence liability, for it is subject to the different formulae
which determine an event to be the proximate or legal cause of an injury.18 By ad-
mitting the element of a discernible causal connection between the omission and the
injury in the present decision, the court indicated that perhaps it was treating the
problem as one of proximate cause applying the public policy or "practical politics"
formula as a means of cutting off the defendant's liability.19 In the court's opinion
considerable emphasis was placed on the aspect of public policy involved.20 At any
rate two standards seem to have been applied, foreseeability on the one hand and
proximate cause as determined by public policy on the other. The decision also indi-
cates that possibly the public policy factor was ,the determinant of foresecability. In
either instance the application of the general rules seems to have been incorrect or at
least ambiguous.
1921) held that notice of a defect subsequent to repair was required on the basis of the
City's being a non-insurer.
15. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 345, 162 N.E. 99, 101 (1928).
16. See Nelson v. City of New York, 264 App. Div. 786, 34 N.Y.S. 2d 963 (2d Dep't
1942). A defect in the sidewalk existing one year constituted constructive notice.
17. O'Neill v. City of Port Jervis, 253 N.Y. 423, 171 N.E. 694 (1930). In Mosher v.
Buffalo Trucking Service, Inc., 277 App. Div. 1075 (3d Dep't 1950), oil from the defendant's
crank case had been allowed to pour onto the street. Plaintiff's motorcycle skidded on the
oil causing him severe injury. The court said: "It is our view that the condition of the
roadway as created by the . . . defendants gave rise to a 'range of reasonable apprehension'
which was subject to varying inferences, and hence was a jury question."
18. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) (dissenting opinion);
Prosser, Torts, 218-21 (2d ed. 1955).
19. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., supra note 18.
20. "In a metropolitan city with heavy traffic, much of it composed of huge trucking
vehicles, we may not require that the municipality anticipate the effect that occurred here.
Involved is the wide variety of structures abutting the populous and myriad streets, and all
of varying degrees of strength, quality and maintenance." Trent v. City of New York 286
App. Div. 479, 481, 144 N.Y.S. 2d 625, 626 (1st Dep't 1955).
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If two standards, namely foreseeability and proximate cause, were confused in the
course of the opinion, ostensibly foreseeability was the principle used in deciding the
case; in this event, the varying inferences from the facts made the foreseeability
issue one for the jury. Authorities have been critical of instances in negligence actions
when courts have relinquished their juristic functions by submitting to the jury for
determination questions properly within the scope of judicial analysis and decsion.2 '
The converse of that criticism is applicable to the instant case where a jury question
appears to have been improperly determined by the court.
WILLS-BENEFICAIrY'S REENUNCIATION OF A TESTA ENTARY TRusT.-Petition was
brought by the trustees for construction of a will which set up a trust fund of approxi-
mately $400,000 for the testator's son. Except for a yearly payment of $S,600 the
son was sole beneficiary of the income and was entitled to the principal, in three
installments, after the death of testator's former wife. After having reached majority,
the beneficiary, in a formal writing, notified the trustees of his renunciation of all
claims to his father's estate. Held, renunciation valid, the trust to continue until
expiration date, when distribution of the corpus will be directed by the court. The
income, in the meantime, is to be paid to those presumptively entitled to the next
eventual estate. Matter of Suter, 207 Misc. 1002, 142 N.Y.S. 2d 353 (Surr. Ct 1955).
Directions by a settlor that the beneficiary of a trust created by him shall not be
permitted to alienate the income either voluntarily, by assignment, or involuntarily,
upon suit by creditors, were not enforced at the common law of the early American
era or in England, where this rule still prevails.' But in the American jurisdictions,
beginning with the last quarter of the past century, the opposite view has gradually
been accepted by case decision and statutory enactment 2 In New York the divergence
from the common law was brought about by the Revised Statutes of 1830. The
statute contained a section prohibiting voluntary or involuntary alienation; this was
subsequently extended to cover all trusts providing for the distribution of income to
a beneficiary, whether the fund consisted of personalty or realty.3 In its present form
the statute relating to personalty reads: "The right of the beneficiary ...to receive
the income of personal property, and to apply it to the use of any person, can not
be transferred by assignment or otherwise. '" 4 The cases interpreting this section leave
21. Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause, 66-71 (1927).
1. 1 Scott, Trusts § 152 (1939); Bogert, Trusts § 40 (3d ed. 1952); See also N.Y. Leg.
Doec. No. 65 (M) at 35-38 (1938); cases illustrating the rule in England are: Brandon v.
Robinson, 18 Ves. 429, 34 Eng. Rep. 379 (Ch. 1811); Graves v. Dolphin, 1 Sir. 66, 57
Eng. Rep. 503 (Ch. 1826).
2. From an historical aspect the American view is best expressed in the influential dictum
of the United States Supreme Court in Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716 (1875). See also Smith
v. Towers, 69 Md. 77, 14 At. 497 (1888); Broadway National Bank v. Adams. 133 Mass.
170 (1882); N.Y. Rev. Stat. 2, c. 1, tit. 2, art. 2, § 63 (1830); Ind. Ann. Stat., §§ 56-604
(Burns 1933) ; La. Civ. Code art. 9850.28 (Dart. 1939). For a summary of the law of the
states today, see Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts § 58 (2d ed. 1947).
3. For a survey of the development of the law of spendthrift trusts in New York, see
Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts §§ 61-71 (2d ed. 1947) and a study of the Law Revision
Commission in N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65 (M) at 41-53 (1938).
4. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 15 (1937); this provision has subsisted in its present wording
since the enactment of N.Y. Laws c. 417 § 3 (1897). A corresponding section is N.Y. Real
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no doubt that all attempts to circumvent a trust provision which may appear disad-
vantageous to a beneficiary, will be frustrated by the courts. Not only have direct
attempts to assign been held invalid5 but the statute is read to have endowed all
trusts, valid in their creation, with the attribute of indestructibility.0 The courts
refuse to terminate the trust where the life beneficiary and remainderman applyjointly,7 or where the life beneficiary became entitled to the remainder.8 Similarly,
a beneficiary's application for permission to invade the corpus has met with refusal
on the general ground of indestructibility of trusts and upon the more detailed argu-
ment that the reduction of the corpus will proportionately reduce the flow of income
which is termed inalienable by the statute.9 The avowed purpose expressed in
the statute is to enable the testator to provide against the improvidence of the
beneficiary. 10
The question raised in the present decision was whether public policy, which is so
emphatically manifested in both statutory and case law, prevents a beneficiary from
effectively renouncing his interest where such action appears obviously improvident
upon the facts of the case. The renouncing beneficiary was of a youthful age and
had no other source of income. His reasons were not further specified than being of
a "moral and political" nature. Should the testator's careful design in the trust ar-
rangement only be upheld in face of the beneficiary's efforts to accelerate the enjoy-
ment of the principal of the trust or also where the beneficiary has chosen to repudiate
it altogether? The wording of the statute gives no conclusive answer to this question.11
In a prior decision involving the validity of a repudiation by the beneficiary the
same Surrogate's Court hesitated in view of section 15 of the Personal Property Law
to recognize the beneficiary's right to renounce. In Matter of Hanna 2 the court ac-
cepted the disclaimer by a life beneficiary in favor of the remainderman only upon
the "special facts of the case" and ordered that the trust should continue and vest in
the remainderman only upon the termination of the life interest as provided by the
terms of the will. As was shown by that decision an acceptance of the beneficiary's
Prop. Law § 103 (1936): "1. The right of a beneficiary of an express trust to receive rents
and profits of real property ...cannot be transferred by assignment or otherwise. .. "
S. Matter of Wentworth, 230 N.Y. 176, 129 N.E. 646 (1920); Central Trust Co. v.
Gaffney, 157 App. Div. 501, 142 N.Y. Supp. 902 (1st Dep't 1913), aff'd, 215 N.Y. 740, 109
N.E. 1069 (1915); Lent v. Howard, 89 N.Y. 169 (1882); In Re Lynch's Estate, 151 Misc.
549, 272 N.Y. Supp. 79 (Surr. Ct. 1934).
6. Cuthbert v. Chauvet, 136 N.Y. 326, 32 N.E. 1088 (1893).
7. In Re Knauss' Estate, 204 Misc. 207, 121 N.Y.S. 2d 5 (Surr. Ct. 1953).
8. Metcalfe v. Union Trust Co., 181 N.Y. 39, 73 N.E. 498 (1905); Dale v. Guaranty
Trust Co., 168 App. Div. 601, 153 N.Y. Supp. 1041 (1st Dep't 1915); In Re Hyatt's Will,
81 N.Y.S. 2d 911 (Surr. Ct. 1948).
9. In Re Sullard's Will, 247 App. Div. 761, 285 N.Y. Supp. 968 (2d Dep't 1936);
Application of Renn, 177 Misc. 195, 29 N.Y.S. 2d 410 (Surr. Ct. 1941).
10. In Re Caswell's Estate, 185 Misc. 599, 602-03, 56 N.Y.S. 2d 507, 510 (Surr.
Ct. 1944), aff'd, 269 App. Div. 809, 56 N.Y.S. 2d 407 (4th Dep't 1945); Matter of
Wentworth, 230 N.Y. 176, 185, 129 N.E. 646, 648 (1920).
11. The language of the statute is sufficiently unequivocal where it prohibits transfer
"by assignment" but it is not clear what is meant by the attached words "or otherwise."
The words were given an inclusive effect in Matter of Perry, 126 Misc. 616, at 620, 214
N.Y. Supp. 461, 464 (Surr. Ct. 1926), where they were rephrased "in any other way."
But such interpretation obviously failed to dispense with the necessity of construction of
the statute by case law in a novel application as it presented itself in the principal decision.
12. 155 Misc. 833, 280 N.Y. Supp. 622 (Surr. Ct. 1935).
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renunciation does not necessarily have an effect on the duration of the trust. The
law provides for the distribution of the income which was renounced to those pre-
sumptively entitled to the next eventual estate. 13 However, the ruling in the Han=
case would seem to have carried too far the rule of indestructibility of trusts under
the New York statutes. Since the protection of the beneficiary is no longer possible
after the acceptance of his renunciation, the trust should be terminated where the
remainder has vested.' 4 The Surrogate's Court subsequently showed increasing readi-
ness to acknowledge the beneficiary's right to renounce: "There can be no question of
this renunciation not being prohibited by Sect. 15 of the Personal Property Law.
...The trust will continue and the law provides for disposition of the renounced
income. . ...15
While it may be arguable whether a renunciation by the beneficiary of a testamen-
tary trust is brought within the mandate of section 15, the law affirms that a gift
cannot be forced upon a man. The Court of Appeals in Albany Hospital v. Albany
Guardian Society stated: ". . . [I]t is settled beyond any opportunity for controversy
that a devisee may refuse to accept, and renounce a provision in his favor and pre-
vent it from being effective."'16 The right to renounce a gift is a fundamental right
and the offer of a court to protect the renouncing party, where, as in the instant case,
"it must be assumed .. that the donee has weighed his decision, .. ."17 would be,
it may well be argued, an interference with his freedom as an individual. This reason-
ing was the basis of the Surrogate's decision in the instant case.
Although in both the Albany and present cases the testamentary disposition was
entirely beneficial, 8 a difference existed in that no trust was involved in the former.
In view of section 15 of the Personal Property Law this difference is very substantial
Where the remainder is vested the remainderman may be willing to pay a lump sum
consideration for the income which the beneficiary would thereupon disclaim. In the
case under review the remainder was not vested and consequently the only interest
resulting to another party from the disclaimer was the payment of the income for an
indefinite period to those presumptively entitled to the next eventual estate. Assum-
ing future cases will rest on a similar fact situation the possibility of a sale of the
beneficiary's interest will be slight, and presumably a secondary consideration for the
deciding court, but the apparent facility with which a sale of the beneficial interest
13. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 63 (1916): "When, in consequence of a valid limitation of
an expectant estate, there is a suspension of the power of alienation, or of the ownership,
during the continuance of which the rents and profits are undisposed of, and no valid
direction for their accumulation is given, such rents and profits sAl belong to the persons
presumptively entitled to the next eventual estate."
14. Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts § 524 (2d ed. 1947).
15. Matter of Alatthiessen, 175 Misc. 466, 470, 23 N.YS. 2d 802, 807 (Surr. CL 1940).
16. 214 N.Y. 435, 440, 103 N.E. 812, 813 (1915). The cited cae contains a
selection of leading English and early American decisions uniformly affirming the right of
a devisee to renounce a devise. For this same principle see also Burritt v. Silliran, 13 N.Y.
93 (1855), where the same court, in reference to the renunciation of an appointment for
trustee, declared: ".... ETlhe law does not compel a man to accept an estate, either
beneficial or trust, against his wilL. .. '
17. 142 N.Y.S. 2d 353, 356 (Surr. Ct. 1955).
18. "While a devisee or legatee may renounce a devise or legacy which.., is entirely
beneficial, by far the greater number of questions of renunciation arise in cases in which
testator has attempted to take some property right... or has attempted to satisfy a
debt . . .and the like." 4 Page, Wills § 1402 (3d ed. 1941).
19561
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
may be transacted where the remainder is vested' 9 cautions from accepting the present
decision as a binding rule for disclaimers by life beneficiaries in New York. There
is little hope that in connection with this decision further clarification of the applicable
principles will be made by the appellate courts since under the Surrogate's Court Act 20
an appeal can be taken only by an aggrieved party and the petitioning trustees do not
qualify under that determination.2 '
WITNESSEs-GRAND JURY'S IMPROPER ATTEMPT TO CONFER IMMUNITY VOIDS CON-
TEMPT CoNvICIo.N-Defendant was called to testify before a grand jury concerning
"kickbacks" from insurance companies to labor unions. During his first three appear-
ances defendant did not claim his privilege against self-incrimination, but gave evasive
answers. At his fourth and final appearance, he asserted the privilege, whereon the
grand jury foreman offered him immunity for the crimes of conspiracy and bribing
labor officials. Defendant then continued to testify in an evasive manner, for which
he was cited and subsequently convicted of contempt. On appeal, held, reversed. The
immunity offered was incomplete, consequently defendant was compelled to give testi-
mony in violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination, and no proceed-
ings for contempt could be predicated thereon. People v. De Feo, 308 N.Y. 595, 127
N.E. 2d 592 (1955).
The New York State Constitution provides: "No person shall be . . . compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . ." A person may be com-
pelled to give self-incriminating testimony only if he is given immunity which is
coextensive with the protection of his constitutional privilege.2 "'Privilege' signifies
the noncompellability to speak about the offense. . . . 'Immunity' signifies the non-
liability for the offense itself. . . . By an immunity the offender's guilt ceases; under
a privilege, it continues."3
The first "immunity statute" in New York4 offered only a limited protection. The
only safeguard that it guaranteed a witness who gave self-incriminating testimony,
was that the particular testimony given would not be admissible against him in a
subsequent trial.5 However, it was permissible for the prosecution to enter evidence
uncovered as a result of using leads obtained from the witness' testimony. The United
States Supreme Court in Counselman v. Hitchcockc refused to give a similar interpre-
tation to the United States Constitution7 and the federal "immunity statute." The
Court ruled that, a witness who is questioned by a federal grand jury need not give
19. But to the effect that the vested or contingent nature of the remainder is not of
itself a deciding criterion for the acceptance or rejection of the renunciation of the ifa
beneficiary, see Blackwell v. Virginia Trust Co., 177 Va. 299, 305; 14 S.E. 2d 301, 303 (1941).
20. N.Y. Surr. Ct. Act § 288.
21. Matter of Heldman, 151 App. Div. 234, 135 N.Y. Supp. 143 (4th Dep't 1912).
1. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6 (1894).
2. People ex rel. Lewisohn v. O'Brien, 176 N.Y. 253, 68 N.E. 353 (1903); People cx
rel. Coyle v. Truesdell, 259 App. Div. 282, 18 N.Y.S. 2d 947 (2d Dep't 1940).
3. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2281 (3d ed. 1940).
4. N.Y. Laws c. 539 (1853). This became 1 342 of The Penal Code in 1882, and
§ 996 of The Penal Law in 1909.
5. People ex rel. Hackley v. Kelly, 24 N.Y. 74 (1861).
6. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
7. U.S. Const. amend. V (1791).
[Vol. 24
RECENT DECISIONS
answers which might tend to incriminate him, in spite of the statutory guarantee
against the use of such testimony in a subsequent trial. The immunity granted by
the statute was not as broad as the peril to which his testimony would subject him.
This rule was adopted in New York in People ex rel. Lewisohn v. O'Brien.8
Shortly thereafter, People v. Gilletteg set forth the rule upon which the instant
case seems to rely. The Gillette rule divides grand jury witnesses into two categories,
those who are probable future defendants, and those who are not. Where the investiga-
tion is in fact directed against the witness, making him a probable future defendant,
the entire proceeding is void, since it is a violation of his constitutional right to require
him to appear before the grand jury and take the oath. The witness who is not a
probable future defendant receives automatic immunity as soon as he claims the
privilege and gives self-incriminating testimony.
Two years after the Gillette decision, a new immunity statute, Penal Law section
584, was passed by the New York Legislature. This statute not only prohibited the
use of a witness' testimony against him in a subsequent trial, but also provided that
".. . no person will be prosecuted ... for or on account of any transaction, matter
or thing concerning which he may so testify or produce evidence. . . .,11 This
statute was held to satisfy the guarantee found in the New York Constitution."
The most recent New York immunity statute, Penal Law section 2447, under which
the instant case was decided, offers the same broad immunity as did section 584, but
the method of obtaining the immunity differs. Under the old law, a witness received
immunity automatically, as soon as he gave self-incriminating testimony. However,
section 2447 provides that ". . if a person refuses to answer a question. .. on the
ground that he may be incriminated thereby, and, notwithstanding such refusal, an
order is made by such competent authority that such person answer the question...
such person shall comply with the order . . . then immunityshall be conferred upon
him. ... Immunity shall not be conferred upon any person except in accordance
with the provisions of this section.'
1
The opinion in the instant case is unclear as to the precise ground for reversing
the defendant's conviction. The court seemed to base its opinion on two grounds, viz.,
the Gillette rule and the attempt of the grand jury foreman to limit the immunity.
As to the first three appearances of the defendant, the court apparently applied the
Gillette rule, thus rendering void that -which occurred. However it must be remem-
bered that the Gillette case was decided when no effecth immunity statute was in
existence, and cases have held that the Gillette rule has no application where immunity
statutes are operative.' 3 In speaking of the Gillette case, the Appellate Division later
said: '"hat was said, however, must be read in light of the fact that no immunity
was afforded by statute."'14 This language makes it quite obvious that even the court
which had written the Gillette opinion no longer considered the rule applicable. Thus,
the only justification for defendant's refusal to answer would be that the immunity pro-
8. 176 N.Y. 253, 69 N.E. 353 (1903).
9. 126 App. Div. 665, 111 N.Y. Supp. 133 (1st Dep't 1903).
10. N.Y. Laws c. 395 (1910).
11. People v. Reiss, 255 App. Div. 509, 8 N.Y.S. 2d 209 (1st Dep't 1938), aff'd, 280
N.Y. 539, 20 N.E. 2d 8 (1939).
12. N.Y. Penal Law § 2447 (1953).
13. People v. Reiss, 255 App. Div. 509, 8 N.Y.S. 2d 209 (1st Dep't 1938), aff'd, 280 N.Y.
539, 20 N.. 2d 8 (1939); People ex rel. Coyle v. Truesdell, 259 App. Div. 282, 18 N.YS.
2d 947 (2d Dep't 1940).
14. People v. Reiss, 255 App. Div. 509, 514, 8 N.Y.S. 2d 209, 214 (1st Dep't 1938),
aff'd, 280 N.Y. 539, 20 N.E. 2d 8 (1939).
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vided by the statute is not coextensive with his constitutional privilege.18 But section
2447 does give complete immunity which is as broad as the peril. 10 Where full im-
munity is granted, a witness must answer or he may be adjudged in contempt.17
The court stated that the immunity attempted to be conferred by the grand jury
was incomplete because the grand jury foreman attempted to limit it to the crimes of
conspiracy and bribing labor-union officials. However, immunity can be conferred only
in accordance with the statute, and the witness receives complete immunity from
prosecution for any crime disclosed or revealed by his testimony.18 Therefore, a
limitation expressed in the offer of immunity does not place any limitation upon the
immunity which is actually conferred. Defendant actually received no immunity, but
this was not because of any defect in the statute, nor because the foreman attempted
to limit the immunity. Upon being ordered to testify in spite of the fact that he had
claimed his privilege, he would have received complete immunity for any crime he
revealed. However, he continued to answer in an evasive manner, thus justifying the
contempt citation.
It seems clear that the purpose of section 2447 is to assist the prosecutor in obtain-
ing information, without the risk of unintentionally granting immunity to a witness
who might later appear as a possible defendant. The statute enables this to be accom-
plished without in any way impairing the constitutional rights of any witness.
Section 2447 seems to set forth two propositions quite clearly: 1. any immunity
which is granted is complete, 2. none can be acquired unless the witness claims his
privilege. The opinion in the instant case complicates the statute and does far more
to confuse the law than to clarify it.
15. See note 2 supra.
16. N.Y. Penal Law § 2447 (1953), People v. Breslin, 306 N.Y. 294, 118 N.E. 2d 108,
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1014 (1964).
17. People ex rel. Hofsaes v. Warden, 302 N.Y. 403, 98 N.E. 2d 579 (1951).
18. See note 16 supra.
